Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1986

Joseph Russell Norton v. N. D. "Pete" Hayward, Salt
Lake County Sheriff : Brief of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Kerry P. Eagan; Salt Lake Legal Defender Association; Attorney for Appellant.
David L. Wilkinson; Attorney General; Earl F. Dorius; Assistant Attorney General; Attorneys for
Respondent.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Norton v. Hayward, No. 198620875.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1986).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/1413

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
JOSEPH RUSSELL NORTON,

Petitioner-Appellant,
-v-

Case No. 20875

N. D. "PETE" HAYWARD,
Salt Lake County Sheriff,
Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT AND ORDER OF
DISMISSAL OF APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR
A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS CHALLENGING
EXTRADITION PROCEEDINGS RENDERED IN THE
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, THE
HONORABLE LEONARD H. RUSSON, PRESIDING.

UTAH SUPREME COUSTf
BRIEF
UTAH
DOCUMENT
KFU

DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General
EARL F. DORIUS
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Attorneys for Respondent

KERRY P. EAGAN
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association
333 South Second East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Appellant

JAM 2 1986
Cterk, Supreme Court, Utah

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
JOSEPH RUSSELL NORTON,

Petitioner-Appellant,
-v-

Case No. 20875

N. D. "PETE" HAYWARD,
Salt Lake County Sheriff,
Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT AND ORDER OF
DISMISSAL OF APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR
A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS CHALLENGING
EXTRADITION PROCEEDINGS RENDERED IN THE
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, THE
HONORABLE LEONARD H. RUSSON, PRESIDING.

DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General
EARL F. DORIUS
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Attorneys for Respondent

KERRY P. EAGAN
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association
333 South Second East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Appellant

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ii

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

iii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

1

STATEMENT OF FACTS

1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

3

ARGUMENT
POINT I

PETITIONER'S PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS
RELIEF FILED UNDER THE UNIFORM CRIMINAL
EXTRADITION ACT, UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 7 7 - 3 0 - 1 0 ( 1 9 82) WAS PROPERLY DENIED
BECAUSE PETITIONER FAILED TO RAISE ANY
ISSUE WHICH I S JUSTICIABLE IN SUCH
PROCEEDINGS

POINT I I

PETITIONER'S EXTRADITION TO COLORADO
I S NOT BARRED BY COLORADO'S PRIOR
FAILURE TO LODGE A DETAINER AGAINST
HIM WHEN HE WAS INCARCERATED IN THE
UTAH STATE PRISON

6

PETITIONER'S PRESENT CONFINEMENT TO THE
SALT LAKE COUNTY JAIL AWAITING EXTRADITION
IS LAWFUL

8

POINT I I I

CONCLUSION

9

-i-

TABLE OF ADTHORITTF.fi

CASES CITED
Burnham v. Hayward. 663 P.2d 65 (Utah 1983)

5

Emig v. Hayward. 703 P.2d 1043 (Utah 1985)

9

Hystad V. Rhay, 12 Wash. App. 872, 533 P.2d
409 (1975)

7

Langley v . Hayward. 656 P.2d 1020 (Utah 1982)

. . . .

5

Michigan v. Dor an, 439 U.S. 282 (1978)

4,5

State v. Coffman. 59 Or. App. 18, 650 P.2d 144
(1982)

7

State v. Newman. 117 R.I. 354, 367 A.2d 200
(1976)

7

United States v. Mauro. 436 U.S. 340 (1978)

7

STATUTES CITED
Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-5 (1982)

6

Utah Code Ann. § 77-30-1 et seq. (1982)

4,8

Utah Code Ann. § 77-30-10 (1982)

4,6

United States Constitution, Art. IV § 2

3

18 U.S.C. § 3182 (1978)

3

-ii-

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1.

Whether P e t i t i o n e r ' s p e t i t i o n for habeas corpus

r e l i e f f i l e d pursuant to Section 10 of the Uniform Criminal
Extradition Act, Utah Code Ann. § 77-30-10 (1982) , raised any
i s s u e s which are j u s t i c i a b l e in such proceedings.
2.

Whether Colorado's f a i l u r e to lodge a detainer

against p e t i t i o n e r when he was incarcerated in the Utah S t a t e
Prison bars Colorado from l a t e r seeking h i s e x t r a d i t i o n a f t e r
p e t i t i o n e r ' s r e l e a s e from p r i s o n .
3.

Whether p e t i t i o n e r ' s present confinement in the

S a l t Lake County j a i l pending resolution of his challenge to
e x t r a d i t i o n i s lawful.

-iii-

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
JOSEPH RUSSELL NORTON,
Petitioner-Appellant,
-v-

Case No. 20875

N. D. "PETE11 HAYWARD,
S a l t Lake C o u n t y S h e r i f f ,
Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT QF THE CASE
The State of Colorado is seeking the extradition of
petitioner, Joseph Russell Norton, for crimes he is charged with
committing in that state.

Petitioner, a Utah parolee, was

arrested in the State of Utah as a fugitive from justice from
Colorado.

Petitioner challenged the extradition by way of a

habeas corpus action filed pursuant to provisions of the Uniform
Criminal Extradition Act, Utah Code Ann. § 77-30-10 (1982) in the
Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State
of Utah, the Honorable Leonard H. Russon, presiding.

Judge

Russon denied habeas corpus relief.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Petitioner was incarcerated in the Utah State Prison
from November 16, 1982 until July 10, 1984 for crimes he
committed in Utah (District Court Record No. C85-1298,
hereinafter referred to as R. at 22). Approximately five months
after his release from prison on parole, petitioner was arrested

in Utah as a fugitive from justice having been charged by
complaint in Colorado with the crime of sexual assault (R. 6).
On February 7, 1985, Utah's Governor issued a Governor's Warrant
authorizing Utah officials to deliver petitioner to authorized
Colorado agents for return to Colorado (R. 22, 23)•
After issuance of the Governor's Warrant, petitioner
filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to the
provisions of the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, Utah Code
Ann. § 77-30-10 (1982).

This petition came on for hearing before

the Honorable Judge Leonard Russon on March 12, 1985 (R. 4, 5).
At the hearing, petitioner did not dispute that he is the person
charged and sought for extradition by Colorado or is the person
named in the Governor's Warrant.

Nor did he place in issue

whether he was in Colorado when the crime was committed or
whether the charge constitutes a crime under the laws of
Colorado.

He also did not challenge the facial legal sufficiency

of Colorado's extradition documents.

His sole contentions were

(1) that the warden of the Utah State Prison did not inform him
there were Colorado charges pending, and (2) that Colorado's
failure to lodge a detainer against him when he was previously
incarcerated in the Utah State Prison violated the intent of the
Interstate Agreement on Detainers, Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-5
(1982), and should now bar his extradition to Colorado (R. 2022) .
The district court denied habeas corpus relief (R. 6,
7) .
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The lower court properly denied petitioner's petition
for ri writ of habeas corpus because petitioner failed to raise
any issues that were justiciable in such proceedings under the
terms of the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act relating to habeas
corpus review of extradition matters.
Alternatively, Colorado has properly sought petitioner's extradition now that he has been released on parole.

Utah

law and the Interstate Agreement on Detainers do not require
Colorado to lodge a detainer against petitioner in order to
secure his later return to Colorado to face charges pending there
or as a prerequisite for extradition,

Because Colorado did not

lodge a detainer against petitioner/ petitioner has no rights
under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers and Colorado is free
to extradite him.
Finally, petitioner is properly confined in the county
jail pursuant

the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, which

requires a fugitive's confinement after issuance of a Governor's
Warrant.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
PETITIONER'S PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS
RELIEF FILED UNDER THE UNIFORM CRIMINAL
EXTRADITION ACT, UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-30-10
(1982) WAS PROPERLY DENIED BECAUSE
PETITIONER FAILED TO RAISE ANY ISSUE
WHICH IS JUSTICIABLE IN SUCH PROCEEDINGS.
Extradition in this country is governed strictly by the
terms and proceedings of Article IV, Section 2 of the United
States Constitution, 18 U.S.C. § 3182 (1978) (which provides a
-3-

limited process for extradition), and by the Uniform Criminal
Extradition Act, codified in Utah Code Ann. § 77-30-1 et seq.
(1982).

While the federal Constitution authorizes extradition,

it fails to provide procedures to accomplish one.

Thus, the

federal statute was promulgated, and the States, to the extent
they do not enact procedures in conflict with the federal
authority, are authorized to agree to a set of uniform procedures
for extradition.

Thus, the Uniform Act has been enacted in

virtually all of the states.

Once enacted, its terms and

conditions are binding on the States party thereto.

Michigan v.

Itonanr 439 U.S. 282 (1978).
The Uniform Act expressly allows a fugitive to
challenge his extradition, but only under a set of orderly
procedures authorized by law.

Once arrested on a Governor's

warrant, and prior to final return to the demanding State,
Section 10 of the Uniform Act accords a fugitive the right to
challenge his extradition by way of habeas corpus review.
Code Ann. § 77-30-10 (1982), provides as follows:
No person arrested upon such
[governor's] warrant shall be delivered over
to the agent whom the executive authority
demanding him shall have appointed to receive
him unless he shall first be taken forthwith
before a judge of a court of record in this
state who shall inform him of the demand made
for his surrender and of the crime with which
he is charged and that he has the right to
demand and procure legal counsel and if the
prisoner or his counsel shall state that he
or they desire to test the legality of his
arrest, the judge of such court of record
shall fix a reasonable time to be allowed him
within which to apply for a writ of habeas
corpus. When such writ is applied for,
notice thereof and the time and place of
hearing thereon shall be given to the
-4-

Utah

prosecuting officer of the county in which
the arrest is made and in which the accused
is in custody, and to the said agent of the
demanding state.
It is under this provision that petitioner filed the instant
action.
The United States Supreme Court has held that the
issues which may be litigated in these specialized extradition
habeas corpus proceedings are strictly limited to (1) whether the
extradition documents on their face are in order, (2) whether the
petitioner has been charged with a crime in the demanding state,
(3) whether the petitioner is the person named in the extradition
request, and (4) whether the petitioner is a fugitive.

Michigan

V. Doran, 439 U.S. 282, 289 (1978) . £££ .alfiQ Burnham v. Hayward.
663 P.2d 65, 67 (Utah 1983); and Langley v. Hayward, 656 P.2d
1020, 1022 n. 1 (Utah 1982).

Petitioner did not assert any of

these issues in the habeas corpus proceedings below.

Rather, he

claimed that the warden of the Utah State Prison should have
advised him of Colorado's charges when petitioner was incarcerated
in the prison that Colorado's earlier failure to lodge a detainer
with the prison should bar Colorado's later demand for extradition
now that petitioner has been released on parole from his incarceration in the Utah State Prison; and that his incarceration in the
Salt Lake County Jail awaiting resolution of the extradition
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.

None of these issues

fall under any of the four proper habeas corpus issues identified
in H&Lan.

Accordingly, habeas corpus relief was properly denied

by the district court.
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POINT I I
PETITIONER'S EXTRADITION TO
COLORADO IS NOT BARRED BY COLORADO'S
PRIOR FAILURE TO LODGE A DETAINER
AGAINST HIM WHEN HE WAS INCARCERATED
IN THE UTAH STATE PRISON.
Assuming a r g u e n d o t h a t p e t i t i o n e r ' s
justiciable

claims were

i n habeas corpus p r o c e e d i n g s which a r e f i l e d

under

S e c t i o n 10 of t h e Uniform C r i m i n a l E x t r a d i t i o n A c t , Utah Code Ann.
§ 77-30-10

( 1 9 8 2 ) , t h e i s s u e s l a c k m e r i t and w e r e

r e j e c t e d by t h e l o w e r

properly

court.

Petitioner's

contention that Colorado's

r e q u e s t i s b a r r e d by C o l o r a d o ' s f a i l u r e
t h e I n t e r s t a t e A g r e e m e n t on D e t a i n e r s

to e a r l i e r

extradition
proceed

under

(IAD), Utah Code Ann.

§ 77-29-5 (1982) ,* is clearly without merit.

The IAD does not

legally obligate a State which has charges pending to lodge a
detainer with an institution in which the defendant might be
incarcerated.

Various provisions of the IAD clearly limit the

applicability of the Act solely to situations where a State has
untried charges pending and. has lodged a detainer against the
prisoner.

Article III reads in pertinent part:
(a) Whenever a person has entered upon a
term of imprisonment in a penal or correctional institution of a party state, and
whenever during the continuance of the term
of imprisonment there is pending in any other
party state any untried indictment, information or complaint on the basis of which a

1

Petitioner's Brief incorrectly
§ 77-29-1 (1982) , which applies
pending against a Utah prisoner,
§ 77-29-5 (1982) , which applies
pending against a Utah prisoner.

refers to Utah Code Ann.
only when there are Utah charges
instead of Utah Code Ann.
when a second state has charges
£££. Petitioner's Brief at 4 f 5.
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detainer has been lodged against the
prisoner. . . .
(c) The warden, commissioner of corrections
or other official having custody of the
prisoner shall promptly inform him of the
source and contents of any detainer lodged

against him* • • •
(d) Any request for final disposition made
by a prisoner pursuant to paragraph (a)
hereof shall operate as a request for final
disposition of all [charges] on the basis of

which detainers have been lodged against the
prisoner* . • .
(emphasis added).

Article IV reads in pertinent part:

(a) The appropriate officer of the
jurisdiction in which an untried indictment,
information or complaint is pending shall be
entitled to have a prisoner against whom he
has lodged a detainer and who is serving a
term of imprisonment in any party state made
available in accordance with Article V(a)
[for trial] . . . .
(b) . . . authorities simultaneously shall
furnish all other officers and appropriate
courts in the receiving state who have lodged
detainers against the prisoner with similar
certificates. . . .
(emphasis added).

£££ alsa. Articles I, V(b)(2), V(c) , V(d) for

similar limiting provisions.

The IAD clearly does not legally

require a State, seeking to prosecute a person serving time in
another state, to lodge a detainer.

A State may choose to proceed

either under the IAD or under the Uniform Criminal Extradition
Act.

£££ Hystad v. Rhay. 12 Wash. App. 872, 533 P.2d 409 (1975).

A prisoner's rights under the IAD do not arise until after a
detainer has been lodged.

United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340

(1978); State v. Coffman, 59 Or. App. 18, 650 P.2d 144 (1982);
State v. Newman, 117 R.I. 354, 367 A.2d 200 (1976).
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Thus, the

lower court properly found that "where a detainer was not lodged
by the demanding State of Colorado, there was no obligation to
notify the petitioner of the outstanding charges" (R. 7 ) .
In the instant casef it is undisputed that Colorado
never lodged a detainer against petitioner (R. 20, 21). £££
Petitioner's Brief at p. 5.

There is only petitioner's

unsupported allegation to suggest that Colorado officials even
knew of petitioner's whereabouts during his incarceration in the
Utah State Prison (R. 23). Instead of lodging a detainer against
petitioner, Colorado properly complied with the requirements of
the Uniform Criminal Extradition Actf Utah Code Ann. § 77-30-1 et
seq. (1982), to obtain his rendition.

Because petitioner had been

released from the Utah State Prison on his Utah conviction,
Colorado's decision to extradite, rather than to earlier lodge a
detainer against him did not frustrate the IAD's rehabilitative
purposes.
Accordingly, Colorado's failure to lodge a detainer
against petitioner when he was incarcerated in the Utah State
Prison does not bar his later extradition to Colorado.

Habeas

corpus relief was thus properly denied on this issue.
POINT III
PETITIONER'S PRESENT CONFINEMENT IN THE
SALT LAKE COUNTY JAIL AWAITING EXTRADITION
TO COLORADO IS LAWFUL.
There is nothing in the record to support petitioner's
claim that his confinement in the county jail pending the final
outcome of his habeas corpus challenge to Colorado's extradition
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment or is otherwise
-8-

unconstitutional, nor does appellant explain how his confinement
allegedly violates his constitutional rights.

He is properly and

constitutionally incarcerated due to the issuance of the Utah
Governor f s warrant.

Under the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act,

a fugitive is not entitled to bail once the Governor's warrant
issues.

Emig v. Hayward, 703 P.2d 1043, 1049 (Utah 1985).

Petitioner's relief from confinement is to seek release on bail in
Colorado after extradition.

See Emig at 1050.
CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing, petitioner's petition for
habeas corpus relief was properly denied.

He should be ordered

extradited to Colorado forthwith.
DATED this cr

day of January, 1986.
DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General

EARL F. DORIUS
Assistant Attorney General
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